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ABSTRACT: In an era of great power competition centered on
warfighting domains other than land, the US Army faces difficult
and likely painful choices. This reality, coupled with looming budget
cuts, means the Army must reconsider its approach to capabilities
and total force structure, its role in homeland security, and the
relationship between its active and reserve components.

W

hen the editors of Parameters gather a new generation of
authors to celebrate the 75th or even the 100th anniversary
of the journal, how will they view the articles that compose
this special 50th anniversary issue? Only time will tell, of course, but
certain themes already seem clear. Those authors of the future will very
likely look back upon the current era as a major strategic inflection point,
much like those following the end of the Second World War, the end of
the Cold War, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
This strategic inflection point involves major changes in the types of
wars the United States plans to fight, as the irregular wars that dominated
the first two decades of the twenty-first century give way to a renewed
era of great power competition and, potentially, conflict. The world is
experiencing deep changes in the character of war, as the exponential
growth of advanced technologies transforms how people fight as well as
how they live. And Americans are asking fundamental questions about
the definition of national security as the coronavirus pandemic raging
through the country has already claimed more US lives than the Second
World War did. In February 2021 projections estimated that COVID-19
would kill more than 610,000 Americans by June 2021.1
These changes in the strategic environment will pose serious
challenges for each of the US military services, but they will challenge
the Army most of all. As the Department of Defense increasingly
focuses on China and as defense budgets decline, the Army will be at a
disadvantage in the strategic and budgetary fights to come.
Yet the Army has a long history of reshaping itself to address the
changing needs of the nation. The service was posted on the frontiers of
the growing nation in the nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth
1. David A. Blum and Nese F. DeBruyne, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists
and Statistics, Congressional Research Service (CRS) RL32492 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 29, 2020),
2; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, “COVID-19 Projections,” accessed February 12,
2021, https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america; and Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, “COVID Data Tracker,” accessed February 18, 2021, https://covid.cdc.gov
/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home.
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century, it fought guerillas in the Philippines and guarded the Mexican
border against marauding bandits. The Army quickly expanded to 4
million soldiers during the First World War, demobilized the vast
majority of them afterwards, and then suddenly grew to more than 11.2
million soldiers during the Second World War.2 Following another
comprehensive demobilization, the Army expanded again for the wars
in Korea and Vietnam and remained a large standing force during the
Cold War. In the 1990s the Army focused primarily on peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement operations, and following the terrorist attacks of
September 2001, it slowly reinvented itself as a counterinsurgency force
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Now the Army must transform itself once again, this time to adapt
to an environment where the nation’s greatest strategic competitor poses
greater potential threats in the maritime and air domains (and the new
domains of space and cyberspace) than in the land domain. And the
Army will have to do so during a time of declining resources and as
the COVID-19 pandemic is making many Americans revisit their basic
assumptions about what constitutes a national security threat. This
transformation will not be easy and will likely be painful. Yet the sooner
the Army embraces these challenges, the better prepared it will be to
continue protecting the nation in this new and evolving era.

Changing Strategic Environment

The United States is currently at a strategic inflection point: the
irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are drawing to a close and a new
era of great power competition is beginning. Yet many of the dynamics
of this new era are still emerging, creating tremendous uncertainty about
the path ahead. While the US strategic environment is transforming in
at least four different ways, none of them are on a clear and predictable
trajectory and may interact and affect each other in ways impossible
to foresee.3
Strategic uncertainty has been increasing during the past several years and shows
no sign of abating. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China’s increasingly
aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have ushered in a new era
of great power competition, which became the cornerstone of the 2018
National Defense Strateg y.4 Yet at the same time, unpredictable regional
actors with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, including North
Korea and Iran, pose persistent threats to the United States and its allies.
Violent extremist groups continue to spread around the globe, aided by
state sponsors in some cases but also including small cells inspired by
al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their ever-proliferating progeny. And several global
trends are interacting in ways that increase global instability, including
2. Blum and DeBruyne, American War, 2.
3. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chap. 9.
4. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense
(DoD), January 19, 2018).
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climate change, urbanization, refugee flows, demographic shifts, and
growing income inequality.5
The number of warfighting domains has increased from three to five, as space
and cyberspace join the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. Although the
US military has utilized space and cyber capabilities in recent decades,
the United States has not fought a war in either domain. But this fact
will almost certainly change in a future war against any reasonably
tech-savvy adversary, which will introduce enormous complexity and
unexpected challenges.
While outer space somewhat resembles the traditional warfare
domains in being defined by physical boundaries, the cyber domain
is markedly different from all the others. Cyber may quickly become
the most important warfighting domain because it critically enables
warfighting in the geographic domains and could therefore pose a
massive vulnerability for the US military. Moreover, hostile cyber actions
raise fundamental questions about the very definition of warfare, as a
growing number of state and nonstate actors can directly target the US
homeland without ever having to encounter the formidable warfighting
capabilities of the US military.6
The current scale and speed of technological change is already unrivaled in
human history and will continue to grow exponentially. Klaus Schwab argues
we are at the brink of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, a massive
global transformation where the boundaries between the “physical,
digital, and biological” realms interact and overlap.7 This revolution will
profoundly reshape every aspect of society, business, government, and,
of course, the military. A new generation of high-tech weapons such
as hypersonics and directed-energy weapons will transform the range,
speed, and destructive power of conventional arms.8
But artificial intelligence, big data, and robotics will also accelerate
the development of autonomous weapons systems, which make
decisions at the speed of light instead of the much slower speed
of human cognition. (Unfortunately this development will reward
adversaries who delegate lethal decision-making authority to these
weapons with the fewest constraints, making it even harder for the
United States and other democracies to impose any ethical or moral
restrictions on their use.) Mass will become increasingly important as
smaller and cheaper technologies proliferate around the world, enabling
5. National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, NIC 2017-001,
(Washington, DC: NIC, January 2017).
6. See David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Irrelevance of Traditional Warfare?” War on
the Rocks, January 27, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/the-irrelevance-of-traditional
-warfare/; and Barno and Bensahel, “A New Generation of Unrestricted Warfare,” War on the Rocks,
April 19, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/a-new-generation-of-unrestricted-warfare.
7. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2016), 8.
8. Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2018); and T. X. Hammes, “Technological Change and the Fourth Industrial
Revolution,” in Beyond Disruption: Technology’s Challenge to Governance, ed. George P. Shultz, Jim
Hoagland, and James Timbie (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 37–73.
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even nonstate actors to employ drone swarms that can effectively
counter US offensive advantages.9
The ways in which most Americans define national security may be shifting as
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.10 For decades the United States has
invested hundreds of billions of dollars each year in the Department of
Defense in order to defend itself against threats from overseas. Yet as
of this writing, over 28 million Americans have contracted the virus,
and 506,834 of them have died from it.11 With so many individuals and
families directly affected by the pandemic—and millions more suffering
from unemployment, social isolation, and other indirect effects—many
Americans will conclude US national security needs to focus far more on
myriad threats from within the homeland than on threats from abroad.
Moreover, Americans will recognize the Department of Defense,
whose over $700 billion annual budget constitutes approximately 15
percent of the entire federal budget, did very little to protect them from
the pandemic and played only a minor role in responding to it.12 A poll
conducted in February 2020, several weeks before lockdowns across the
nation began, found 31 percent of those surveyed thought the United
States spent too much on defense.13 That number is likely to rise in the
coming months and years as Americans increasingly prioritize internal
threats over external ones.
And even if public support for the defense budget remains strong, the
massive economic crisis caused by COVID-19 means the United States
may not be able to afford continued high levels of defense spending.
In January 2020 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected
the federal budget deficit for fiscal year (FY) 2020 would be about $1
trillion and would average $1.3 trillion a year for the next decade.14 By
June, however, CBO projected the combination of pandemic relief and
declining government revenue meant the FY 2020 deficit would be $3.7
trillion and an additional $2.1 trillion in FY 2021.15
Even after adjusting for inflation these figures constitute the largest
deficit in US history—even greater than the deficit during all the years
9. See Scharre, Army of None; Hammes, “Technological Change,”; and David Barno and Nora
Bensahel, “War in the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” War on the Rocks, June 19, 2018, https://war
ontherocks.com/2018/06/war-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.
10. See David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “After the Pandemic: America and National Security
in a Changed World,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03
/after-the-pandemic-america-and-national-security-in-a-changed-world/.
11. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “COVID Data Tracker,” accessed February
27, 2021.
12. “Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal Budget,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
(website), updated April 2, 2020, https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the
-federal-budget-process.
13. “Military and National Defense,” Gallup (website), https://news.gallup.com/poll/1666
/Military-National-Defense.aspx.
14. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030
(Washington, DC: CBO, January 28, 2020).
15. Phillip L. Swagel, “Budgetary Effects of the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic,” letter to
Senator Rick Scott, June 5, 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-06/56388-CBO-Scott
-Letter.pdf.
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of the Second World War combined.16 And the actual deficit in FY 2021
is likely to be higher than the CBO projection because the pandemic
continued unabated in late 2020 and early 2021, with infection rates
that dwarfed those of spring 2020. Current and future pandemic relief
measures will place upward pressure on an already debilitating deficit.
Deficit spending adds to the national debt of course. In late April
2020, economist Brian Riedl estimated the total costs of the pandemic
would add more than $8 trillion to the national debt over the next
decade. The debt was already projected to almost double during that
period, but this added load led Reidl to estimate it would grow from
$17.9 trillion in 2019 to $41 trillion by 2030.17 And that is almost certainly
a low estimate since Riedl assumed most of the economy would reopen
by the summer of 2020—which did not happen in large parts of the
country—and the number of infections would continue to decrease,
when they rapidly escalated instead. This rising debt will significantly
increase the amount of interest the United States must pay—already
$375 billion in 2019—further consuming government revenue and
pressuring discretionary spending downward.18
Furthermore the political dynamics surrounding the new Biden
administration also suggest the defense budget is about to shrink, and the
cuts could be as large, if not larger, than those of the sequestration era.
Though President Biden and his advisers are committed internationalists
who believe in a strong leadership role for the United States, his highest
priority will remain dealing with the pandemic and its aftermath. He
has already proposed an additional $1.9 trillion in pandemic relief, and
though Congress may not adopt this proposal in full, the legislation
will substantially increase the deficit and the debt.19 He will also need
to adopt some policies that satisfy the more progressive wing of the
Democratic party, which will continue to urge cuts to the defense budget.
In July 2020, for example, 93 members of the House and 23 members
of the Senate voted for a proposal by the Congressional Progressive
Caucus to cut defense spending by 10 percent and redirect those funds
to coronavirus relief and other domestic priorities.20
With the Democrats now controlling the Senate, members of that
party who support cutting the defense budget for any reason may find
16. Todd Harrison and Seamus P. Daniels, Analysis of the FY 2021 Defense Budget and Its
Implications for FY 2021 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
February 2020), 57.
17. Brian Riedl, “Coronavirus Budget Projections: Escalating Deficits and Debt,”
Manhattan Institute, April 29, 2020, https://www.manhattan-institute.org/coronavirus-cbo-budget
-deficit-projection.
18. Christine Bogusz et al., “The Federal Budget in 2019: An Infographic,” CBO (Washington,
DC: CBO, April 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324.
19. Jim Tankersley and Michael Crowley, “Biden Outlines $1.9 Trillion Spending Package
to Combat Virus and Downturn,” New York Times, January 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes
.com/2021/01/14/business/economy/biden-economy.html.
20. Alex Emmons, “Progressives Plan to Push Big Cuts to Defense Spending, Citing
Coronavirus Crisis,” Intercept, June 24, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/defense
-spending-coronavirus-bernie-sanders/; and John Nichols, “We Can No Longer Afford the
Military-Industrial Complex,” Nation, July 22, 2020, https://www.thenation.com/article/politics
/house-senate-defense-spending/.
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more support for such a move. Moreover, as Biden begins his presidency,
congressional Republicans may find their best opposition strategy
involves embracing fiscal conservatism once again. That strategy worked
fairly effectively after 2008 when a new Democratic president took
office during the economic crisis now known as the Great Recession.
The Budget Control Act of 2011, which contained the much-hated
sequestration mechanism, was originally passed under pressure from
Republicans who opposed President Barack Obama and the escalating
national debt.
Now after the 2020 election, a new Democratic president has once
again taken office during an enormous economic crisis rivaling the early
years of the Great Depression.21 Republicans may well determine the
best way to oppose Biden—and improve their election prospects over
the next four years—involves sounding the alarm on the escalating
national debt. Taken together, these dynamics mean defense spending is
about to decline; the only question is by how much. And this reality will
make it even more challenging for the US military to prepare effectively
for seismic changes in the strategic environment.

Challenges Facing the Army

All the services will find it difficult to adapt to this new environment
amidst declining budgets, which will force them to make hard choices
about force structure, end strength, and acquisition programs. Yet the
Army faces more challenges than the other services as the growing
threat from China means the Indo-Pacific is now the US military’s most
important theater of operations. Unfortunately for the Army that shift
suggests land will no longer be the most critical or most decisive domain
of warfare for the United States.
A future war with China will be defined by the air and sea domains
together with the new domains of space and cyber. As a result the
Army has a tremendous disadvantage in the strategic arguments and in
upcoming budget fights. In order to adapt successfully to this enormous
shift, the Army will have to address the following four challenges:
focusing on the nation’s secondary theater; the increasing relevance of
fires over maneuver; the new demands of homeland defense; and the
growing importance of the reserve component.22

A Supporting Service

Although the 2018 National Defense Strateg y prioritized great power
competition with China and Russia, the Department of Defense has
now explicitly prioritized competition with China.23 Toward the end of
21. David C. Wheelock, “Comparing the COVID-19 Recession with the Great Depression,”
Economic Synopses 39 (2020), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020
/08/12/comparing-the-covid-19-recession-with-the-great-depression.
22. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Headwinds Looming for the U.S. Army,” War on the
Rocks, October 27, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-headwinds-looming-for-the-u
-s-army/; and Barno and Bensahel, The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day after Tomorrow
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, September 2016).
23. Mattis, 2018 National Defense Strategy.
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his term Secretary of Defense Mark Esper clearly stated his goal was
“to focus the Department on China,” because China was “the pacing
threat” for which the US military must prepare.24 To do so he directed
the development of a new “joint warfighting concept,” and instructed
the National War College to focus half of its coursework on China.25
The Biden administration has signaled it will provide stronger
support for Europe and NATO Allies and partners and has affirmed
the prioritization of China as our “most serious competitor.”26 In
2018, for example, two of the most senior China experts in the Obama
administration conceded many US assumptions about China had been
wrong and called for a new strategic approach.27 Biden’s team will face
the simple and sobering fact that only a rising China has the enormous
economic power, the cutting-edge technologies, and the advanced
military capabilities that could match or exceed those of the US armed
forces—and potentially defeat them.
This shift has significant implications for the Army. For decades it
has effectively been the first among equals of the US military services.
During the Cold War the Army provided most of the NATO forces
postured to deter or defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It also
provided most of the forces that fought in Korea, Vietnam, the 1991
Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all of these conflicts the Army was
the supported service. Yet the explicit focus on China over Russia means
this traditional relationship is about to flip. The Army will primarily be
a supporting service in any potential conflict with China, enabling the
other services to operate in the vast air and maritime domains of the
western Pacific.
This seismic shift means the Army will no longer conduct the
primary type of military operations against the nation’s biggest strategic
threat, fundamentally upending the key warfighting roles and missions
it has focused on for the past 75 years. Its ground combat forces will
remain essential for deterrence and, if necessary, warfighting on the
Korean peninsula, but otherwise the Army’s role in the vast Indo-Pacific
theater will remain limited.
The Army does not seem to have fully absorbed the implications of
this shift, however, as it continues to push for a combat role in the Pacific.
It is still planning, for example, to conduct littoral operations throughout
24. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Message to the Force on
Accomplishments in the Implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” July 7, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2266872/secretary
-of-defense-mark-t-esper-message-to-the-force-on-accomplishments-in-im/; and Jim Garamone,
“Esper Discusses Moves Needed to Counter China’s Malign Strategy,” DoD News, August 27,
2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article 2326863/esper-discusses-moves
-needed-to-counter-chinas-malign-strategy/.
25. Garamone, “Esper Discusses Moves.”
26. Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” (speech,
US Department of State, February 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
27. Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American
Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March/April 2018): 60–70, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning.
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the region even as the Commandant of the Marine Corps General
David Berger reshapes his service to focus on this specific mission.28
As defense budgets, end strength, and force structure all decline,
the Army needs to focus instead on its unique and essential mission of
providing critical enablers to the rest of the Joint Force in the Pacific.
These include vital capabilities like expanded land-based air and missile
defense, theaterwide logistics and engineering, electronic warfare, and
possibly long-range precision fires.29 Sustainment and protection will be
critical vulnerabilities for US forces in the Pacific, and it is far from clear
whether the Army can provide them effectively against a high-capability
adversary. As resources decline, the Army needs to shift its time, energy,
and thinking away from conducting combat operations in the Pacific
and into these less glamorous but absolutely crucial responsibilities.
The Army’s traditional ground combat forces will still be required
in Europe. Russia remains the most capable and dangerous threat to the
United States in the land domain, and Army forces will still need to deter
Russian aggression and bolster NATO’s defenses. But those missions,
which were the highest US strategic priority for many decades, are now
lower national defense priorities than deterring, and possibly defending
against, Chinese aggression in the Pacific. The fact the land domain—
the Army’s primary warfighting domain—is now of limited importance
against the nation’s preeminent threat will pose enormous cultural and
practical challenges for the service in the years ahead. The Army will
almost certainly see cuts to its force structure and end strength and will
likely accept a higher degree of risk in the European theater.

Fires Over Maneuver
The Army is also facing challenges from the changing relationship
between fires and maneuver as weapons technology advances and longrange fires become an increasingly vital component of warfighting.
Traditionally the Army has devoted a significant part of its force structure
to maneuver units—the infantry, armor, and cavalry units that assault
the enemy and seize and hold terrain—and has used fires from rockets
and artillery to support them. Yet the advent of precision long-range
fires is inverting this relationship, especially in the Pacific. Traditional
artillery generally could hit targets within a range of 15 to 25 miles.
Today, land-based precision rockets and missiles are being developed

28. David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps (USMC), 2019); and Berger, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters,
USMC, March 2020).
29. Sean Kimmons, “Army to Build Three Multi-Domain Task Forces Using Lessons from
Pilot,” Army News Service, October 15, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/228393/army_to
_build_three_multi_domain_task_forces_using_lessons_from_pilot; and Sean Kimmons, “Army
Aims to Further Refine MDO with Indo-Pacific Partners,” Army News Service, June 1, 2020,
https://www.ar my.mil/article/236120/ar my_aims_to_further_refine_mdo_with_indo
_pacific_partners.
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that will strike beyond 1,000 miles, and hypersonic weapons are being
developed that will have vastly greater ranges.30
This unprecedented technological advance is inverting the
traditional relationship between maneuver and fires, which poses a
significant cultural problem for the Army. For the first time, land forces
will be able to strike adversaries at strategic ranges without having to
resort to nuclear weapons, which means they may be able to deliver
strategic effects. The Army may soon be able to use such long-range
fires to destroy adversary units, command and control networks, and
vulnerable logistics supplies. The best way for the Army to contribute
to a future war in the Pacific could involve using these powerful new
capabilities to strike a wide range of targets on land and at sea, utilizing
few, if any, maneuver forces.
This reality suggests the Army is now overinvested in brigade
combat teams. Such maneuver forces will probably not play a significant
role in any conflict against the nation’s primary strategic threat, and
their large footprints and substantial electronic signatures make them
increasingly vulnerable to an adversary’s long-range strikes. As a result,
the Army may need to cut sharply the number of brigade combat teams
in its force structure, especially as defense budgets decline and the
services are required to use their more limited resources wisely. The
Army should prioritize cuts to infantry brigade combat teams, which
lack the mobile firepower and robust protection needed to ensure
survivability during any high-intensity conflict. The service should then
reinvest some of the resources freed by these cuts into more long-range
fires and other enabling capabilities for the Pacific (especially in missile
defense and logistics units).

Homeland Defense
As noted above, the pandemic has demonstrated the United States
is more prepared to address overseas threats than to protect its citizens
from threats within the homeland. Yet for all the human suffering
the pandemic has caused, the origins of COVID-19 were benign—a
natural, if lethal, variant of a coronavirus. A malevolent attack on the
US homeland, however, could be far more disastrous. During the
pandemic, basic necessities like food, water, and power have remained
widely available (if increasingly unaffordable for too many Americans).
Yet a concerted cyberattack on the United States could far too easily
disrupt supply chains that provide these and other essential goods. And
a deliberate attack against US space assets could disrupt or destroy vital
military and civilian communications capabilities that enable GPS and
other critical infrastructures.

30. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tests New A2/AD Tools: Howitzers, Missiles & 1,000mile Supergun,” Breaking Defense, May 1, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/army-tests
-new-a2-ad-tools-howitzers-missiles-1000-mile-supergun/; and Kris Osborn, “The U.S. Army Wants
a 1,000 Mile Range Cannon,” National Interest blog, September 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest
.org/blog/buzz/us-army-wants-1000-mile-range-cannon-168967.
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Any future conflicts with a major foreign adversary will almost
certainly spill over into the homeland, with potentially disastrous
consequences. But such attacks could also occur outside the bounds of
traditional warfare, launched by a state adversary trying to stay below
the threshold of armed conflict or even by a disaffected group of hackers
operating from their basements around the world.31 In either case the
consequences could be devastating.
As direct threats to the homeland continue to grow, the Army will
play a key role in helping prevent such attacks and an even greater role in
helping to mitigate the consequences. Throughout the nation’s history,
the Army has always been the principal military service responsible for
defending Americans at home. In recent decades its most important
domestic mission has been responding to natural disasters like floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes, and wildfires—a role that will become even
more important as climate change makes these events more frequent
and intense. The Army remains a critical part of the nation’s toolkit in
responding to many domestic emergencies, since it has extraordinarily
capable organizations standing ready to provide a wide range of
logistics, communications, and engineering support to civil authorities
when needed.
Yet active duty Army forces will likely play only a limited role in this
increasingly vital mission. In a conflict that occurs mainly at home, the
Army Reserve and especially the Army National Guard will be far more
important. The National Guard operates day-to-day under the command
of state governors and is the first military responder to civil disruptions
that exceed the capacity of local authorities. During the pandemic,
the Army Reserve joined the National Guard in helping beleaguered
city and state officials provide food, medical care, and specialized
services like mortuary affairs to hard-hit areas, while the active Army
contributed comparatively little.32 In a larger homeland emergency, the
Guard and Reserve could lead even broader missions such as providing
humanitarian assistance, restoring power and water, and preventing civil
disorder. The rising vulnerability of the US homeland will increasingly
require the Army to prioritize domestic emergency response capabilities
in its reserve forces, requiring tough trade-offs with active capabilities
in future constrained budget environments.

The Reserve Component
The Army has always viewed its active forces as the first among
equals within the three elements of the total force. Active Army units
have traditionally been accorded the first priority for scarce resources
and new equipment. Yet growing threats to the homeland combined
with the coming era of fiscal austerity may require reversing this
31. Barno and Bensahel, “Traditional Warfare?”; and Barno and Bensahel, “Restricted Warfare.”
32. Arnold L. Punaro, Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves,
Appendix B (Falls Church, VA: Reserve Forces Policy Board, 2020), https://rfpb.defense.gov
/Portals/67/Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves_1 November 2016.
pdf ?ver=2016-11-17-142718-243.
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traditional relationship. Reserve forces are a wise strategic investment.
They preserve more combat and support force structure at less cost than
active forces, which require much higher investments in readiness to
be able to deploy rapidly around the world. And unlike active forces,
reserve forces provide readily accessible capabilities for both homeland
and overseas operations. Future wartime demands may find these forces
pulled in both directions, but they nevertheless remain a cost-effective
investment across all Army missions.
As the move to a supporting role and declining defense budgets force
the Army to make some painful choices, it must avoid the temptation to
make equal cuts to active, Reserve, and Guard end strength and force
structure simply to share the bureaucratic pain more equally. Instead,
the Army may need to preserve some reserve capabilities at the expense
of some active capabilities. This move would strengthen the total force’s
ability to defend the homeland while simultaneously husbanding critical
warfighting capabilities in the most economical way possible. Some of
these choices would undoubtedly require the Army to accept more risk
in any future European conflict than it would like. But such decisions
would be entirely consistent with the decision US political leaders have
already made, which identifies China as the nation’s top strategic priority.
Shrinking the Army’s active component more than its reserve
component will pose an immense cultural challenge, however. When
defense budgets contracted during the sequestration era, the Army’s
active and reserve components engaged in an all-out bureaucratic war
that can only be characterized as fratricide, leading Congress to charter
an independent commission to referee the fight.33 The Army, and the
country more broadly, cannot afford to repeat that experience.
Current Chief of Staff of the Army General James McConville faces
the daunting task of managing this countercultural change. He must do
so by ensuring active, Reserve, and Guard forces all have an equal seat
at the table when cuts are considered. And after tough decisions have
been made behind closed doors, all Army senior leaders must emerge in
solidarity, emphasizing the needs of the entire Army rather than any of
its individual components. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General
Mark Milley used this approach to heal the Army’s divisions after the
debacle described above (as did former Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General Mark Welsh III after a similar crisis in his service a few years
earlier).34 McConville should learn from their approach as he faces the
even greater challenge of preventing the Army from disintegrating into
factionalism once again.

33. National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), Report to the President and the
Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016 (Washington, DC: NCFA, 2016).
34. National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF), Report to the President and
the Congress of the United States, January 30, 2014 (Arlington, VA: NCSAF, 2014).
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Conclusion

The Army is facing extremely difficult challenges as it transforms
itself for a new era of great power competition. It will have to manage
considerable strategic uncertainty, two new domains of warfare,
exponential leaps in technology, and the increasing importance of
homeland defense—all while defense resources decline and the service
transitions from a supported to supporting role against the nation’s
greatest strategic threat. The Army has successfully redefined itself many
times throughout its history, but this endeavor, like those of the past, will
entail hard, painful choices about many things, including its capabilities
and force structure, the growing mission of homeland security, and
the relationship between Army active and reserve components. Wise
decisions on these matters will help ensure the Army remains a relevant
and vital element of the nation’s military power in the years and decades
to come.

